Reclaiming the UN Charter: A Legal Path to Peace in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine is a human tragedy. It is also a hard test for the United Nations (UN).

Cities have been destroyed. Families have been separated. Millions have been forced from their homes. Yet the UN Security Council (UNSC), the body charged with primary responsibility for international peace and security, has repeatedly been unable to act because a permanent member directly involved in the conflict can use its veto.[1]

This is not merely a political problem. It raises a constitutional question that has never fully gone away.

In 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) dissolved. The Russian Federation then continued the USSR’s UN membership, including its permanent UNSC seat. The transition was accepted in practice without a Charter amendment or a formal vote creating a new Russian seat.[2]

That outcome may have been politically understandable in a moment of upheaval. But it left important legal and institutional questions unresolved.

The time has come to examine those questions calmly, lawfully, and without turning the UN into another battlefield.

The Charter’s Unaltered Text

Article 23 of the UN Charter still names the USSR as a permanent member of the UNSC.[1]

The Charter has never been amended to replace the words “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” with “Russian Federation.” Yet Russia has occupied the USSR seat since December 1991.

On 24 December 1991, President Boris Yeltsin informed the UN Secretary-General that Russia would continue the USSR’s membership in the UN, including its role in the UNSC. The letter stated that Russia would assume the USSR’s rights and obligations under the Charter. The arrangement was accepted by the UN in practice, and Russia continued to participate without a separate admission vote.[2]

That history matters.

It does not prove that Russia’s seat is automatically unlawful. Nor does it settle every question about continuity and succession. It does show that one of the UN’s most consequential institutional changes took place without a formal Charter amendment.

The text stayed the same. The practice changed.

Continuity and Succession

International law distinguishes between a continuing state and a successor state. The distinction can be difficult to apply when a multinational state dissolves.

Russia was widely treated as the continuing state of the USSR for many international purposes. It assumed treaty obligations, inherited much of the former Soviet diplomatic structure, and continued the USSR’s UN membership.[2]

Other former Soviet republics followed a different route. Most sought and received UN membership as newly independent states. Belarus and Ukraine were exceptional because both had been original UN members in 1945.

This history does not create a simple legal formula. The USSR’s dissolution was unusual. Its consequences were worked out through political acceptance, diplomatic practice, and institutional continuity.

Still, the issue cannot simply be swept under the rug.

The Charter continues to name the USSR. Russia continues to occupy the seat. The gap between text and practice remains visible.

Ukraine and the Veto Problem

The weakness of the present system became painfully clear after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russia vetoed a UNSC draft resolution that would have deplored its aggression and demanded an end to the offensive. The General Assembly later adopted Resolution ES-11/1 by 141 votes to 5, with 35 abstentions, deploring Russia’s aggression and demanding withdrawal of Russian forces.[3]

The contrast was striking.

The General Assembly could express the will of a large majority of UN Member States. The UNSC could not adopt binding action because Russia held a veto.

This is the central problem.

A state involved in a conflict can block the Council from responding to that conflict. The institution meant to protect collective security can be held up by the very power whose conduct is under scrutiny.

The result is paralysis.

What the Charter Already Says

The Charter does not leave the UN without guidance.

Article 24 gives the UNSC primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 25 provides that UN Member States agree to accept and carry out Council decisions made in accordance with the Charter.[1]

Article 27 also contains an often-overlooked safeguard. In decisions under Chapter VI and Article 52(3), a party to a dispute must abstain from voting.[1]

That rule does not remove the veto in every situation. Its application is limited, and it has not prevented permanent members from voting in many cases involving their own conduct. But it reflects an important principle: no party should sit in judgment of its own case.

That principle should not be left on the shelf.

The UN should develop clearer procedures for identifying when a permanent member is a party to a dispute and when abstention should be expected under the Charter.

Clarification, Not Retaliation

This article does not argue that Russia should be excluded from the UN.

Russia is a major state. It has a central role in European and global security. A durable peace will require dialogue with Russia, not the fantasy that Russia can simply be ignored.

But dialogue must rest on clear rules.

The UN should clarify the legal and institutional basis on which Russia continues the USSR’s permanent seat. It should also examine how the veto may be limited when a permanent member is directly involved in an armed conflict.

Such clarification could take several forms:

• A request by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) or UNSC for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on questions concerning Charter interpretation and the legal consequences of state continuity.[4]
• A UNGA debate and resolution addressing procedures for abstention when a permanent member is directly involved in a dispute.
• A broader reform process focused on regional representation, equitable geographic participation, and limits on veto abuse.
• Continued use of the General Assembly’s veto initiative, under which the Assembly meets after a veto is cast in the UNSC.[5]

None of these steps would end the war overnight.

But they could begin to clear the fog around rules that have been allowed to remain uncertain for too long.

The China Example: Useful but Limited

In 1971, UNGA Resolution 2758 recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representative of China at the UN and restored its rights, including China’s permanent UNSC seat.[6]

That episode is sometimes cited as proof that the General Assembly can freely transfer a permanent seat.

The comparison must be handled carefully.

Resolution 2758 concerned which government represented China. It did not create a new state or amend the Charter. The Russia–USSR question concerns state continuity after the dissolution of a multinational state. The facts are different.

Still, the China episode shows that the UN has addressed major representation questions through institutional action when political conditions allowed it.

The lesson is modest but important: difficult questions do not disappear merely because they are difficult.

Peace Requires Institutions People Trust

Peace cannot rest only on ceasefires. Ceasefires matter. Negotiations matter. Mediation matters. But lasting peace also depends on institutions that people regard as lawful, fair, and capable of acting.

The UN remains the world’s only universal forum where every state can be heard. It coordinates humanitarian action, supports peace efforts, and provides the central framework for international law.

Its value should not be written off.

But institutions must keep up with history. The League of Nations failed in part because it could not respond effectively when peace was under threat. The UN must not drift into the same trap.

A Charter that is ignored loses force. A Council that cannot act loses trust.

The Path Forward

The immediate goal must be peace in Ukraine.

Every responsible diplomatic effort should be encouraged. States may mediate, host talks, offer humanitarian assistance, propose ceasefires, and support negotiated settlements. Such efforts can help lower tensions and create room for agreement.

But national diplomacy cannot replace the UN framework for collective security.

The UNSC remains the body given primary responsibility under the Charter. When it is blocked, the UNGA, the ICJ, regional organizations, and national diplomats all have roles to play. None can fully fill the gap on its own.

That is why reform matters.

The 1991 transition should not be used merely as a weapon against Russia. It should be studied as a reminder that major constitutional questions cannot safely be left unresolved forever.

The UN must work through those questions with patience, legal care, and political courage.

Conclusion

The UN Charter begins with “We the Peoples.”

Those words call for a system that serves humanity, not merely the interests of the strongest states.

The Russia–USSR transition of 1991 was accepted in a time of uncertainty. More than three decades later, its consequences deserve careful examination.

The purpose is not to reopen old wounds for their own sake.

It is to strengthen the UN’s capacity to prevent new ones.

Peace will not come from rhetoric alone. It will come when law, diplomacy, and moral responsibility pull in the same direction.

The UN need not be discarded.

It needs to be renewed.

References

[1] Charter of the United Nations, arts. 23–25, 27, 39, 94, 96, and 108.

[2] Letter dated 24 December 1991 from Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, to the UN Secretary-General, concerning continuation of USSR membership by the Russian Federation; UN membership records.

[3] UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, Aggression against Ukraine, 2 March 2022; UN Security Council voting record on the draft resolution of 25 February 2022.

[4] Charter of the United Nations, art. 96; Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 65.

[5] UN General Assembly Resolution 76/262, Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council, 26 April 2022.

[6] UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, 25 October 1971.

About the Author

Shiv R. Jhawar, MAS, EA, CA, is the founder and president of Noble World Foundation and author of Building a Noble World, a book exploring global unity through spiritual awakening.

About Noble World Foundation

Founded in 2004, Noble World Foundation in Chicago is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. Its mission is to inspire change in individuals through meditation. Individuals are the world. When individuals change, the world changes. Join us at nobleworld.org.