War

Reclaiming the UN Charter: A Legal Path to Peace in Ukraine

How a 1991 Oversight Continues to Paralyze the Security Council

Copyright © 2025 Noble World Foundation. All rights reserved.

By Shiv R. Jhawar, MAS, EA, CA

The war between Russia and Ukraine is a profound humanitarian tragedy—and it also reveals a deeper structural weakness in the global governance system. In 1991, the Soviet Union’s permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was transferred to the Russian Federation without a formal legal process, treaty, or Charter amendment. This unresolved procedural gap has enabled repeated vetoes, hindered collective action, and strained the credibility of international law.

As cities are struck and millions are displaced, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) remains unable to act decisively, constrained by the veto power of a permanent member directly involved in the conflict. This paralysis is not incidental—it is structural. At its core lies a legal ambiguity that has remained unresolved for more than three decades: the unformalized transfer of the Soviet Union’s permanent seat to the Russian Federation.

The time has come to address this anomaly—not through rhetoric, but through lawful and principled clarification. The UN Charter need not be rewritten; it must simply be upheld. Only then can the Security Council function as intended and act effectively in the service of peace.

The Charter’s Unaltered Text

The Charter’s language is explicit. Article 23 of Chapter V states: “The Republic of China, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council.”

This language has never been amended, and the term “Russian Federation” does not appear in the Charter. Yet since December 1991, the Russian Federation has continued in the USSR’s seat without a General Assembly vote, without a Security Council recommendation, and without the procedures outlined in Article 4, which states that “admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

This transition did not follow the Charter’s formal procedures. Instead, it was initiated through a letter sent on 24 December 1991 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to UN Secretary‑General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar:

“The membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United Nations, including the Security Council and all other organs and organizations of the United Nations system, is being continued by the Russian Federation (Russian SFSR) with the support of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In this connection, I request that the name ‘Russian Federation’ should be used in the United Nations in place of the name ‘the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.’”

No vote followed, and no Charter amendment was proposed. The international community accepted the transition in practice, even though the Charter itself remained unchanged.


Continuity vs. Succession: A Legal Distinction

International law distinguishes between a continuing state and a successor state. A continuing state retains the full legal personality and entire territory of its predecessor, while a successor state inherits only a portion. With 51 percent of the Soviet population and 76 percent of its territory, the Russian Federation emerged as one of fifteen successor states—not the sole continuation of the USSR.

As Yehuda Zvi Blum, former Israeli Ambassador to the UN, noted: “With the demise of the Soviet Union itself, its membership in the UN should have automatically lapsed and Russia should have been admitted to membership in the same way as the other newly independent republics (except for Belarus and Ukraine).”

Ukraine has expressed a similar view. Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya stated at the UN that the Russian Federation never formally applied for membership under Article 4 and that its use of the veto rests on a status that was never formally ratified.


The Cost of Procedural Silence

The absence of formal ratification has had significant consequences. The Russian Federation continued in the USSR’s seat without a Charter amendment or UNGA approval. When the conflict in Ukraine escalated in 2022, the veto was used to block a Security Council resolution addressing the situation. As Yehuda Zvi Blum observed, “the silence of 1991 has become the paralysis of today.”

This created a situation in which a party to the conflict held the power to block Council action. The Security Council—designed to serve as the international community’s primary guardian against war—found itself unable to respond.

On 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the invasion by a vote of 141–5–35. Yet the Security Council—the only body empowered to authorize binding measures—was unable to act. As Ukraine’s delegate noted in 2025, the situation had become “the most vivid example of how detrimental the misuse of the veto could be.”


 Restoring Procedural Clarity

The Charter offers a lawful path forward: clarifying the status of the USSR seat rather than permanently assigning it to any single successor state. One possible approach could involve collective stewardship of the seat by all fifteen successor states through a cooperative regional framework, or the use of a neutral placeholder until the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides guidance on the succession question.

There is relevant precedent. In 1971, UNGA Resolution 2758 recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the representative of China and transferred the permanent seat from Taipei to Beijing without amending the Charter. This example illustrates that changes to permanent representation have occurred through General Assembly action alone.


Practice Cannot Replace Principle

Supporters of the current arrangement often cite thirty years of uninterrupted practice—acceptance of credentials, inheritance of the Soviet arsenal, and assumption of treaty obligations. Yet practice alone cannot replace principle. The Charter continues to list the USSR. The admission process outlined in Article 4 was never initiated, and the amendment procedure under Article 108 was never invoked.

As Ukraine has argued, the Russian Federation’s status rests on “a unilateral letter, not Charter law.” Procedural convenience in 1991 cannot serve as a lasting foundation for legitimacy in 2025.


Toward a Charter That Serves Humanity

Clarifying the status of the USSR seat is not about isolating Russia. As former UN Under‑Secretary‑General Yasmine Al‑Sharif emphasized: “It is about creating a framework where all former Soviet states—including Russia eventually—can cooperate rather than conflict. But that requires Russia to relinquish exclusive control of the seat and accept pooled sovereignty.”

Such reform would not weaken the UN; it would strengthen it. A reconstituted Council—organized around regional groupings such as Europe, Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Eurasia—could broaden participation, reduce reliance on the veto, and enhance the Council’s credibility.

Peace cannot rest on ceasefires alone; it requires legitimate and trusted institutions. The unresolved succession question of 1991 remains a structural gap within the UN system. Until it is addressed, conflicts such as the one in Ukraine may continue to be shaped by an unratified veto.

The moment has come to address the unfinished business of 1991—to let law guide power, to let legitimacy replace silence, and to let dignity become the shared inheritance of all peoples.

Peace is not a privilege—it is a principle. And it begins with resolving the constitutional question that has remained unanswered since the USSR flag was lowered for the last time.

Current Diplomatic Efforts

Recent diplomatic initiatives—including high‑level meetings hosted by the United States to encourage an end to the Russia–Ukraine war—reflect a growing global desire for peace. Under the UN Charter, any member state may mediate peace, host negotiations, propose ceasefires, offer diplomatic incentives, and encourage dialogue; these actions are fully consistent with international law. Yet the Charter also makes clear that no single nation, regardless of its influence, can bypass or replace the authority of the UN Security Council. Articles 24 and 25 assign the Council primary responsibility for international peace and security, and its decisions are binding on all member states. National diplomacy can therefore support peace efforts, but the legal framework for binding action remains with the Security Council.

These diplomatic efforts underscore the urgency of resolving the unresolved succession question of 1991, so that peace initiatives—whether national or international—can rest on a foundation of clear and legitimate Charter authority. Lasting peace arises when nations honor both the law that governs them and the inner dignity that unites them. This raises a broader question about the future of the United Nations itself.

Is the United Nations Still Relevant?

The question of the UN’s relevance has become increasingly urgent as global conflicts intensify and the Security Council faces repeated paralysis. The League of Nations ultimately failed because it could not prevent war; the UN now stands at a similar crossroads. Yet unlike its predecessor, the UN remains the world’s only universal diplomatic forum, the custodian of international law, and the coordinator of humanitarian relief. Its relevance endures—but it depends on its ability to address structural weaknesses, including the unresolved succession question of 1991. Institutions of peace survive only when they evolve. Without reform, the UN risks drifting toward the fate of the League of Nations; with reform, it can remain humanity’s central instrument for collective security.

Action, Not Applause 

Ultimately, meaningful progress depends not on applause but on action. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and the only body empowered to interpret the UN Charter authoritatively. It is respected by all nations, regardless of political pressure, and holds a uniquely independent role in addressing questions of succession, continuity, and Charter interpretation. The ICJ is therefore the key to clarifying the unresolved succession issue of 1991. When the Court speaks, the world listens—not because of politics, but because of law.

Timeline: From USSR Dissolution to the Ukraine War

26 Dec 1991 — The Soviet Union is formally dissolved by Declaration No. 142-N. President Mikhail Gorbachev resigns, ending the USSR’s legal existence.

24 Dec 1991Russian President Boris Yeltsin, not the outgoing Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, sends a unilateral letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar asserting that the Russian Federation will continue the USSR’s membership in the United Nations, including its permanent seat on the Security Council, “with the support” of other CIS member states. This claim was neither ratified by a General Assembly resolution nor formalized through an amendment to the UN Charter under Article 108. To this day, Article 23 of the Charter continues to list the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” as a permanent member, underscoring the unresolved legal status of Russia’s succession.

1992 — Belarus and Ukraine, already listed as founding members since 1945 under Article 3 of the UN Charter, retained their seats. The remaining twelve republics—including Moldova, the Baltic states, the Caucasus nations, and Central Asian countries—formally applied for UN membership and were admitted between September 1991 and July 1992. Russia never applied.

Note: The UN Charter still lists the “USSR,” not Russia, as a permanent member.

1994 — The Budapest Memorandum: Ukraine surrenders the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. These guarantees later collapse.

2014 — Russia annexes Crimea, violating the Budapest Memorandum and international law.

23 Feb 2022 — Russia launches a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, violating Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain… from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

25 Feb 2022 — A U.S.–Albanian draft resolution in the UN Security Council condemning Russia’s aggression is vetoed by Russia.

2 Mar 2022 — The UN General Assembly condemns Russia’s invasion with 141 votes in favor, deploring the attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty.

16 Mar 2022 — The ICJ orders Russia to suspend all military operations in Ukraine.

7 Apr 2022 — The General Assembly suspends Russia from the Human Rights Council (93 votes in favor).

26 Apr 2022 — The General Assembly passes a resolution requiring permanent members to justify vetoes publicly.

30 Sep 2022 — Russia vetoes a Security Council resolution rejecting its attempted annexation of Ukrainian regions.

12 Oct 2022 — The General Assembly condemns Russia’s annexations with 143 votes in favor, 5 against, demanding withdrawal.

23 Feb 2023 — On the invasion’s first anniversary, the General Assembly calls for Russia’s immediate withdrawal under the UN Charter.

17 Mar 2023 — The ICC issues an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, citing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

31 Jan 2024 — The ICJ finds Russia in violation of international anti-terrorism and anti-discrimination treaties, though it dismisses most charges tied to the 2014 annexation.

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